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NOTE 

CRIMINAL LAW-THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO MI­
RANDA V. ARIZONA: A RETROSPECTIVE AND COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 
(1984) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In New York v. Quarles, 1 the United States Supreme Court con­
fronted a case in which there was no question that the requirements of 
Miranda v. Arizona2 had been violated.3 The suspect's self-incriminat­
ing statement, obtained in violation of Miranda, could not be used to 
prove his guilt.4 The Court, however, created an exception to the Mi­
randa requirements and held that police need not advise a criminal 
suspect of his constitutional rights when they "ask questions reason­
ably prompted by a concern for the public safety."s The Court deter­
mined that "concern for public safety must be paramount to 
I. 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). 
2. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
Miranda required that a suspect in police custody must be warned prior to any ques­
tioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him 
in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot 
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
[d. at 479. 
3. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631. 
The threshold question to determine when a criminal suspect is entitled to the warn­
ings required by Miranda is whether he is in police custody or is "otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. 
In Quarles, the suspect had been handcuffed immediately by Officer Kraft and hence 
was entitled to receive the Miranda warnings before the police interrogated him. Quarles, 
467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631; See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) 
(Miranda applies when suspect is under arrest whether or not interrogation takes place in 
police station); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (Miranda applies when 
accused is questioned in jail on an unrelated charge); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. He was 
then interrogated about the whereabouts of a weapon that the police believed he had been 
carrying. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629-30; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291, 300 (1980). 
4. E. g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3145 (1984). But cf. Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)(statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to 
impeach the accused's trial testimony). 
5. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. 
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adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated 
in Miranda."6 As an exception to the dictates of Miranda, failure to 
recite the required warnings will no longer bar the admissiblity of 
statements made in response to custodial interrogation7 as long as 
that questioning is geared to protecting the public safety.8 
Although the majority claims Quarles is a narrow exception to 
the requirements of Miranda, the public safety exception has the po­
tential to expand significantly. To test the bounds of the public safety 
exception, this note will focus on its impact through a retrospective 
review of three Supreme Court cases decided before Quarles. The pur­
pose of this approach is twofold. First, the note will explore the 
breadth of the public safety exception9 through an analysis of the facts 
in Orozco v. Texas.lO The character of a threat to public safety which 
justifies invocation of the Quarles exception is far from clear. While 
the court said that it is only an imminent threat to public safety which 
justifies custodial interrogation without fulfilling the requirements of 
Miranda, the Court did not provide any guidance to determine the 
magnitude of danger necessary to trigger the Quarles exception. 
Second, the note will. consider the possible expansion of the public 
safety rationale to the Fifth Amendment right to counsell I and the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel12 through examination of the facts 
in Rhode Island v. Innis 13 and Brewer v. Williams. 14 On another 
plane, Quarles may only serve as a logical progression in the Court's 
increasing focus on public safety. The court has recognized the permis­
sibility of warrantless entries and searches in the interest of protecting 
6. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630. A significant element in the Court's analysis is the 
finding that the Miranda requirements are not constitutionally mandated, but rather are 
prophylacttic measures to ensure protection of the right against self-incrimination. Id. at 
-, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974». See infra 
notes 105-150. 
7. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. The Court in Miranda said that "the 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe­
guards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
444. 
8. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. 
9. See infra notes 82-104 and accompanying text. 
10. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). 
11. See infra notes 105-150. 
12. See infra notes 151-190. 
13. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
14. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
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the public. IS The Court has now read a public safety exception into 
Miranda's Fifth Amendment protections. 16 The next logical step in 
the progression is to apply the narrow exception of Quarles to the judi­
cially created Fifth Amendment right to counsel. But how far should 
the court extend the public safety reasoning? While it is harmonious 
with Quarles to extend the exception to permit abridgement of the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Court's reasoning is inapt to 
justify an extension of Quarles into the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. 
II. FACTS 
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., a woman 
informed two police officers on road patrol in Queens, New York, that 
she had been raped at gunpoint.17 The two officers, Frank Kraft and 
Sal Scarring, drove the woman one quarter of a block to the supermar­
ket which she saw her attacker enter. IS Officer Scarring radioed for 
assistance while Officer Kraft entered the supermarket in search of the 
suspect. 19 Officer Kraft stood at the front of the deserted store20 and 
saw the respondent Quarles, who matched the description of the rap­
15. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)("A burning building clearly 
presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable.' "). 
In finding that Miranda's requirements are not constitutionally mandated, the Court 
closely tracks the course it has been following in gradually diluting the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630, n.3; Gardner, The 
Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L. J. 429, . 
457 (1984). Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984)(ex­
clusionary rule is "a judically created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect rather than a personal constitutional right of 
the person aggrieved.")(quoting Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974» with 
Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985)(failure to provide Miranda should not bar 
admissibility of a non-coerced confession where suppression would not serve deterrence 
function). 
16. But cf Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.3 (Fifth Amendment require­
ments cannot be outweighed upon a showing of reasonableness but judicially created Mi­
randa rights are subject to balancing test). 
17. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629. 
18. Brief for the petitioner at 4, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 
(1984). 
19. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629. 
20. [d. In determining that the weapon which Quarles was alleged to be carrying 
was missing in the supermarket, thereby posing a danger to the public safety, the majority 
failed to take note that there were no customers in the supermarket at the time. See [d. at 
-, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. The dissent, however, focused on this omission to question the 
validity of the majority's conclusion that the missing weapon posed a danger to public 
safety. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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ist,21 approach the check-out counter. Upon seeing Officer Kraft, 
Quarles fled to the rear of the store with Officer Kraft in pursuit. 22 
Quarles was promptly surrounded by Officer Kraft and three other 
police officers.23 While the officers pointed their guns at Quarles, Of­
ficer Kraft frisked him and discovered an empty shoulder holster. 24 
Officer Kraft then handcuffed Quarles, at which time the other officers 
put their guns away.25 After handcuffing Quarles, Officer Kraft asked 
him, "Where is the gun?'~6 Quarles looked in the direction of some 
nearby cartons and said, 'The gun is over there. '~7 After Officer Kraft 
pulled a loaded revolver from one of the cartons, he told Quarles that 
he was under arrest and then gave him the Miranda warnings. 
Quarles then consented to answer further questions regarding the gun, 
and he admitted that he was the owner of the weapon.28 
Quarles was subsequently prosecuted for criminal possession of a 
weapon29 under New York law. 30 At a suppression hearing, the trial 
court excluded the statement "the gun is over there" on the ground 
21. The woman described the rapist as a six foot black man who was wearing a black 
jacket with yellow letters which spelled out "Big Ben." Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629. 
22. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629-30. 
23. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630. 
24. Id. See also id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
25. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
26. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630. Quarles admitted that he had purchased the gun in 
Miami, Florida. Id. On the admissibility of the subsequent confession after the Miranda 
warnings have been given, see Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985)(holding that con­
fession obtained after Miranda warnings given not tainted by a prior voluntary confession 
which violated Miranda on grounds that failure to comply with Miranda evokes no consti­
tutional illegality). 
29. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2629. Although Quarles was initially 
charged with rape as well, the record does not disclose the reason the state failed to prose­
cute further. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.2. 
30. Quarles was originally charged with possession of a weapon in the second degree. 
Joint Appendix at la, Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). "A person is guilty of 
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when he possesses a ... loaded 
firearm with intent to use the same unlawfully against another." N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§265.03 (McKinney 1980). The grand jury, however, returned an indictment of one count 
of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 
2626 (1984) Joint Appendix at 3a. "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon 
in the third degree when [h]e knowingly possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession 
shall not . . . constitute a violation of this section if such possession takes place in such 
person's home or place of business." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1980). 
Since the state failed to prosecute Quarles for rape, he could not be prosecuted with 
intending to use the gun against another, thereby necessitating reduction of the charge to 
simple unlawful possession. See People v. Forestieri, 87 A.D.2d 523, 448 N.Y.S.2d 12 
(1982). 
1986] PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION 103 

that it had been made without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. 31 
The court also suppressed both the weapon and the subsequent admis­
sion of ownership as tainted fruit derived from the prior Miranda 
violation.32 
The appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York unani­
mously affirmed the suppression order without opinion.33 The New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed in a 4-3 decision.34 The court of ap­
peals held that Quarles's statement and the gun were properly sup­
pressed because they were obtained in the absence of preinterrogation 
warnings to safeguard the privilege against se1f-incrimination.35 Addi­
tionally, the court held that the admissions obtained after Miranda 
warnings had been given were properly excluded as tainted fruit. 36 
The court of appeals noted: 
Even if it be assumed that an emergency exception to the normal rule 
might be recognized if the purpose of the police inquiry had been to locate 
and to confiscate the gun for the protection of the public as distinguished 
from their desire to obtain evidence of criminal activity on the part of the 
defendant. . . there is no evidence in the record. . . that there were exigent 
circumstances posing a risk to the public safety or that the police interroga­
tion was prompted by any such concern. 37 
The dissenters thought, however, that the single question posed 
by Officer Kraft was not custodial interrogation within the meaning of 
Miranda because it was designed "to achieve an articulable and legiti­
mate noninvestigatory purpose. "38 The dissent saw Officer Kraft's ini­
31. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630. 
32. [d. at -, 104 s. Ct. at 2630. The Supreme Court has decided, however, relying 
on Quarles, that there is no fruit of the poisonous tree for noncoercive Miranda violations. 
See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985). 
33. People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1981)(mem.), affd, 58 
N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 
(1984). 
34. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S2d 520 (1982), 
rev'd, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). 
35. [d. at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521. 
36. [d. Even if the original Miranda violation was not excusable, Quarles' subsequent 
admission would still be admissible since the giving of Miranda warnings dissipated the 
taint of the original illegality. See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). 
37. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d at 666, 444 N.E.2d at 985 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521. 
38. [d. at 669, 444 N.E.2d at 987, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). 
The dissent read Miranda to be "concerned with discouraging official conduct which, ex­
amined objectively, reveals an unmistakably deliberate attempt to elicit some incriminating 
response from the detainee ...." [d. at 668-69, 444 N.E.2d at 987, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 523 
(Wachtler, J., dissenting). See Gardner, supra note 15 at 455-60; cj United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3405,3418 (I 984)(purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter violation 
of Fourth Amendment by police officers). 
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tial question as a "prudent measure undertaken to neutralize the very 
real threat of possible physical harm which could result from a 
weapon being at large."39 
III. DECISION 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court 
of Appeals and held that both Quarles's statements and the gun could 
be admitted into evidence.40 The Court held that on "these facts there 
is a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings 
be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence."41 
The Court considered two issues in the formulation of this rule. 
First, the Court distinguished the warnings required by Miranda from 
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.42 The Court labelled the 
Miranda warnings as "prophylactic measures" to protect an individ­
ual's privilege against self-incrimination as compared to a constitu­
tional right of the defendant.43 
39. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d at 671, 444 N.E.2d at 524, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 524, 
(Wachtler, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted). 
40. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, -, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2634 (1984). 
41. [d. In finding that the circumstances of this case posed an imminent threat to 
public safety, Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court is in effect relitigating the factual 
determinations of the court below. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissent­
ing); see supra text at note 37. 
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court will give great weight to findings of fact made by state 
courts on constitutional claims. See Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 456-57 (1984); Time, 
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 463 (1976). The Court, however, wi1llook into the factual 
determinations of the state courts when findings below create a situation in which constitu­
tional rights may be infringed. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978); 
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,515-16 (1963). 
The finding of the New York Court of Appeals that the record indicated that there 
was not a threat to public safety did not create a situation where a citizen's constitutional 
rights were in danger of infringement. In contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Quarles, by reaching factual conclusions opposite to those the state court, has itself created 
a circumstance where the privilege against self-incrimination, protected by the Constitu­
tion, may have been infringed. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Mar­
shall, J., dissenting); cf Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 314 (I 980)(Stevens, J., 
dissenting)(Court redetermined factual question of whether defendant was interrogated for 
Miranda purposes under the Court's newly created standard of interrogation). 
Although Justice Rehnquist finds it suitable to reach the decision in Quarles by a re­
adjudication of the facts, he took great exception in another Miranda case decided the 
following term in which he accused the majority of reaching their decision by "deciding 
[an) essentially factual inquiry contrary to the three other courts that have considered the 
question." Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 495-96 (1984)(per curiam)(Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
42. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631. 
43. [d. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974». See Oregon v. El­
stad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). 
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Second, the Court justified the public safety exception by pro­
claiming "that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a 
threat to public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule 
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimina­
tion."44 It referred to the willingness of the Miranda Court to accept a 
lower conviction rate as the cost of giving additional reinforcement to 
the Fifth Amendment.45 The Court in Quarles, however, determined 
that an exception to Miranda is necessary where the cost of reinforcing 
the Fifth Amendment is an unchecked threat to the public welfare 
rather than merely a lower conviction rate.46 The Court reasoned that 
to require Miranda warnings would deter a suspect from answering 
questions when an imminent threat to public safety existed.47 
Justice Marshall wrote a passionate dissent castigating the major­
ity's treatment of the case and accusing the Court of abusing the facts 
in deciding the appeal.48 Marshall noted that the New York Court of 
Appeals had determined that the missing weapon did not pose a dan­
ger to public safety, while the Quarles majority, on the same facts, felt 
constrained to create a public safety exception.49 
More significantly, Justice Marshall assailed the majority's crea­
tion of the public safety exception as an erosion of Miranda's bright­
line rule. 50 He expressed concern over whether police officers would 
be capable of drawing distinctions between interrogations designed to 
protect the public and those designed to gather evidence. 5 I 
Finally, he expressed concern with the majority's holding that the 
need to protect the public could outweigh the accused's need for pro­
tection of the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by Mi­
randa. 52 Justice Marshall read Miranda as concerned with protecting 
the Fifth Amendment privilege and not as a formula to balance 
44. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633. 
45. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. 
46. /d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632-33; but see Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 718 
(1979). 
47. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632-33. In fact, interrogation under the 
Quarles rule is likely to be coercive given the urgency of obtaining information to extin­
guish a pending threat to the public. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
48. Justice Marshall was joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Stevens. 
49. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
50. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2643 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra 
notes 20-27, 37, 40-41 and accompanying text. 
5!. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra 
text at notes 60-64. 
52. Quarles, 104 U.S. at -, S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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costs.53 He also predicted that the public safety exception would en­
courage the police to withhold deliberately the Miranda warnings in 
order to obtain information. 54 Ultimately, Marshall feared that 
Quarles would give police carte blanche to coerce responses from sus­
pects under the guise of protecting the public. 55 
In addressing the dissent's criticism that the public safety excep­
tion would allow introduction of coerced self-incriminating state­
ments,56 the Court stated that on remand Quarles could always 
attempt to prove that his answers to Officer Kraft's questions were 
coerced57 under traditional standards.58 In addition, the Court 
claimed that "absent actual coercion by the officer, there is no consti­
tutional imperative requiring the exclusion of the evidence that results 
from police inquiry" into matters posing a threat to public safety.59 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The assertion that the rationale underlying Miranda is offended 
only when an involuntary confession is sought to be introduced is 
flawed for two reasons. First, one of Miranda's primary goals was "to 
give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow."60 An important focus for the Miranda Court 
was that the facts surrounding custodial police interrogation are un­
certain,61 thereby debilitating an adequate assessment of whether a 
particular confession was coerced under the totality of the circum­
stances.62 Although he wrote the majority opinion in Quarles, Justice 
53. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2645. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647. 
56. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647-2648. 
57. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5. The New York Court of Appeals, 
however, upon receiving the case on remand denied Quarles the opportunity to present 
evidence in court that his response had been coerced stating that "[i]nasmuch as the issue 
was raised and defendant had full opportunity to offer evidence, there is no occasion, . . . 
to order a new evidentiary hearing; the question should be resolved on the record of the 
prior hearing." People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 925, 473 N.E.2d 30, 31 483 N.Y.S.2d 
678, 679, (1984)(mem.)(citation omitted). 
58. See lW. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2 (1984). 
59. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633 n.7; but see Michigan v. Mosely, 423 
U.S. 96, 99-100 (1975)(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974)); cf. Smith v. 
Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 495 n.8 (1984)(per curiam)(Fifth Amendment right to counsel "is a 
prophylactic safeguard whose application does not turn on whether coercion in fact was 
employed") Id. 
60. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42; Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 113 (1975)(Bren­
nan, J., dissenting). 
61. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448; See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631. 
62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. The Miranda Court, acknowledging that the chal­
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Rehnquist has conceded that a central concept of Miranda was "to 
offer a more comprehensive and less subjective protection than the 
doctrine of previous cases."63 The public safety exception has elimi­
nated the bright-line rule that was once Miranda's greatest attribute.64 
Second, although protection of the public safety is a valued 
goal,65 the interest of the state in fighting crime does not excuse a dis­
regard for an accused's constitutional rights.66 "The policies underly­
ing the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination are not 
diminished simply because testimony is compelled to protect the pub­
lic's safety."67 As a practical matter, when faced with a pressing need 
to thwart a threat to the public, interrogation designed to obtain this 
information is bound to be coercive in order to avoid delay.68 While 
the Quarles Court claims to have removed a dilemma from the shoul­
ders of the police,69 the Court's new exception fails to heed Justice 
Brennan's reminder in Michigan v. Mosley70 that measures designed to 
protect the Fifth Amendment privilege must be sensitive to the dan­
gers of compulsion.71 Hence the Court, while seeking to achieve a le­
gitimate goal in formulating the Quarles rule, has ignored the concern 
of the constitutional framers for the criminally accused to be free of 
coercive tactics designed to wring self-incriminating statements from 
their lips. 72 
lenged confessions in the four consolidated cases before it might not have been coerced 
under traditional standards, believed that the Fifth Amendment nevertheless required 
warnings designed to eliminate the inherent compulsion of police questioning of a suspect 
in their custody. [d. Considering that the circumstances surrounding custodial question­
ing are cloaked in secrecy, the Court chose to require that warnings be given to all defend­
ants who are subjected to custodial interrogation. [d.; Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 
2646 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 6.5 
(1984). 
63. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442-443; see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 
718 (1979). 
64. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part); 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2644 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
65. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
66. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977). 
67. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2649 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
68. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
69. [d. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633. "We decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft 
in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best 
serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and 
render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the 
warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly 
damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation 
confronting them." [d. at 2633 (footnote omitted). 
70. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
71. [d. at 115-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
72. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-61. 
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Allowing the interrogation of a criminal suspect without Miranda 
warnings in the interest of public safety would indeed protect the pub­
lic. But permitting the fruits of such an interrogation to be admitted 
into evidence would not further the interests of public safety. "Police 
officers genuinely concerned with saving lives would continue to seek 
such information even at the risk of jeopardizing subsequent convic­
tion of the suspect. "73 
In an apparent attempt to counter the argument that nothing 
would prevent the Quarles rule from applying to all custodial interro­
gations,74 the majority sought to keep the exception within the narrow 
context in which it was intended to operate. The Court implied that 
the public safety exception would apply only to situations where there 
was an imminent threat to the public safety.75 It remains to be seen 
whether courts applying the rule in Quarles to future cases will remain 
faithful to its narrow focus. 76 
73. Gardner, supra note 15 at 473. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2648 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.222, 225 (1971)(confession ob­
tained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach defendant's testimony as prohibited 
police practices are sufficiently deterred when confession is unavailable to the state to prove 
its case in chief); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964)(exigent circum­
stances may provide justification for obtaining statements in violation of Sixth Amendment 
though they may not be introduced at trial). 
74. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2643 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
75. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying 
text for discussion of the ambiguous nature of the imminency requirement. 
76. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633. Illinois has held that Quarles is only applicable to 
cases wherein the police have only limited time to defuse a volatile situation. People v. 
B.R., 133 Ill. App. 3d 946, 479 N.E.2d 1084 (1985); See People v. Roundtree, 135 Ill. App. 
3d 1075, 482 N.E.2d 693, 697-98 (1985); Compare Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 
2632-33 (this was a "kaleidoscopic situation" where the police had only "a matter of 
seconds" to choose whether to preserve the admissibility of evidence or to quell a threat to 
the public safety). 
Presently only one court has admitted a custodial statement obtained without Miranda 
warnings solely under the Quarles rule. People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr. 
242 (1985)(missing knife). See also United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1240 n.4 (8th 
Cir. 1984)(missing shotgun)(dicta). 
Regrettably, miscomprehension of the public safety exception is already apparent as 
the Fifth Circuit has stated that Quarles would be applicable where necessary to protect not 
the public safety but the defendant's safety in the case of his impending suicide. United 
States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 392 n.14 (5th Cir. 1985)(dicta). 
Additionally, courts have expresed hostility toward the case. See Rogers v. United 
States, 483 A.2d 277, 283 (D.C. App. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1223 (l985)("We 
choose not to reach the constitutionality of an exigent circumstances exception to Miranda 
... even were we to assume Quarles to be of retroactive effect.") ; Nebraska v. McCarthy, 
218 Neb. 246, 249,353 N.W.2d 14, 17 (1984)("Whatever the merits of the Quarles holding, 
that case is simply not this case ... [t]he house in question was surrounded by armed men; 
defendant McCarthy was certainly 'deprived of his freedom'; and there was no public dan­
ger present"). 
109 1986] PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION 
The scope of the Quarles rule will evolve on a case by case basis as 
reviewing courts determine whether or not the interest of public safety 
may excuse a given Miranda violation.77 An instructive device for 
testing the contours of the public safety exception is to reconsider 
prior United States Supreme Court cases by applying the Quarles rule 
to the facts of those prior cases.78 
The note will analyze three cases using this method. They have 
been chosen because their facts are such that were they presented to a 
reviewing court today, the prosecution could make colorable argu­
ments that the violation of the suspect's "constitutional rights" were 
excusable in the interest of protecting the public safety under the 
Quarles rule. The three cases are: Orozco v. Texas,79 Rhode Island v. 
Innis,80 and Brewer v. Williams. 81 
A. Orozco v. Texas 
Police arrested and interrogated Orozco in his bedroom, without 
giving him Miranda warnings,82 four hours after a murder had been 
committed. The police asked Orozco whether he had been at the 
scene of the murder and whether he owned a weapon. Orozco an­
swered these questions as well as two additional questions concerning 
77. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
78. The Court has previously rejected this method of analysis in the context of fash­
ioning standards for the determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a search 
warrant. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983). The reasons for the Court's 
disapproval of this method, however, are not present in a review of prior cases under the 
Quarles rule. 
First, the Court rejected this method for analyzing the validity of the "totality of the 
circumstances" test for determining whether probable cause exists because "[t]here are so 
many variables in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a 
useful precedent for another." Id. In the context of the public safety exception, however, 
this complexity is not present since the Quarles rule will apply only if there was an objective 
need to interrogate a suspect without Miranda warnings. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. 
Ct. at 2632. Additionally, the rule in Quarles is purported to be easy to apply. Id. at -, 
104 S. Ct. at 2633. 
Second, in Gates the Court had revamped the prior probable cause standard ofAguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Gates, 462 
U.S. 213. In Quarles however, the Court did not revamp Miranda but carved out an excep­
tion to the rule. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. Hence, rather than apply­
ing a reformed standard to prior cases, reflective application of Quarles to Orozco and to 
Innis only seeks to apply the exception to the rule under which those prior cases had been 
decided. Considering Brewer v. Williams under the Quarles reasoning only tests a possible 
progression in the public safety concept. 
79. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). 
80. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
81. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
82. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 325. 
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the location of the weapon.83 The answers to these questions were 
admitted at trial,84 and Orozco was convicted of murder. 85 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the 
ground that Orozco's responses to the police interrogation were ob­
tained without Miranda warnings.86 The Court addressed its holding 
to the question of whether Miranda's requirements were only applica­
ble to station-house questioning.87 While the four consolidated cases 
decided in Miranda all dealt with police station questioning,88 the 
Court held that its decision would also be applicable to police interro­
gation conducted "after a person has been . . . deprived of his free­
dom of action in any significant way."89 Although Miranda stressed 
the compelling nature of the incommunicado environment inherent in 
police station questioning,90 the Court in Orozco had no difficulty in 
holding that Miranda warnings were required under the facts in 
Orozco.91 As the circumstances surrounding the questioning were in­
herently compelling,92 the Court was unpersuaded by the state's argu­
ment that Miranda should not apply when the suspect was 
interrogated in the familiar surroundings of his own bedroom. 
The fact that the interrogation in Orozco occurred four hours af­
ter the murder does not diminish the same dangers that moved the 
Court in Quarles to find a threat to public safety: namely, that the 
missing weapon might be used by an accomplice or might cause injury 
to an innocent person.93 As Justice Marshall noted in Quarles: "In 
both cases, a dangerous weapon was missing, and in neither case was 
there any direct evidence where the weapon was hidden."94 
Although the Quarles Court stressed the time lapse between the 
arrest of the suspect and the alleged crime in Orozco as significant,95 
the requirement that the threat to public safety be "imminent" is a 
83. Id. 
84. Id at 325-26. 
85. Id. at 324. 
86. Id. at 326. 
87. See id. at 326-27. 
88. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
89. Id. at 444 (dicta)(footnote omitted). 
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
91. Orozco, 394 U.S. at 326-27. 
92. Id. at 326-27. The state argued that since Orozco was interrogated in his bed­
room, the compelling atmosphere of police station questioning at issue in Miranda was not 
present. The Court was not persuaded by this argument in light of the general concern of 
the Miranda Court about the compelling nature of custodial questioning in general. Id. 
93. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2643 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8. 
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major weakness in the Court's contention that the new exception will 
be a narrow one. Differing judicial perceptions of whether a particular 
threat is imminent will cause great variance in the scope of the Quarles 
rule96 as it is interpreted by individual judges.97 Although Justice 
Rehnquist characterizes the missing weapon in Orozco as not present­
ing an imminent threat to public safety, his view of remoteness may 
well be another judge's view ofimmediacy.98 A broader interpretation 
of what constitutes an imminent threat to public safety would result in 
an affirmance of Orozco's conviction on grounds that the Miranda vio­
lation should be excused on public safety grounds. 
The Quarles majority also sought to distinguish Orozco by noting 
that the interrogation in Orozco was only investigatory rather than 
prompted by a need to protect the public.99 The distinction, however, 
is without merit. In Quarles, the suspect had been asked only one 
question, Where is the gun?l00 In Orozco the police had asked the sus­
pect four questions: what was his name, whether he had been at the 
scene of the murder, whether he owned a pistol, and where the 
weapon was located. \01 Justice Harlan, concurring, felt constrained 
by stare decisis to reverse Orozco's conviction but noted that the deci­
sion condemned a "perfectly understandable, sensible, proper, and in­
deed commendable piece of police work ..."\02 since the police 
already had a solid case against Orozco. As Justice White suggested, 
the police had sufficient evidence to link Orozco to the crime, and the 
interrogation was a prudent measure to ascertain the location of the 
missing weapon to protect the public. \03 Moreover, had the police 
asked Orozco but one question, such as, Where is the gun?, the notion 
that the question was investigatory would be lost. The focus of the 
questioning then would undoubtedly have been on locating the 
weapon to protect the public, rather than on linking Orozco to the 
96. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 s. Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part); Traynor, The Devils ofDue Process in Criminal Detection, Detention and 
Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 659 (\966). "We may try to see things as objectively as we 
please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own." B. CARDOZO, 
The Method ofPhilosophy, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9, 13 (\921). See 
also People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1985). 
97. See Orozco, 394 U.S. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting). 
98. Cardozo, supra note 96, at 12. 
99. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8. 
100. Id., 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 467 U.S. at-, 
104 S. Ct. at 2633. 
IO\. Orozco, 394 U.S. 330 (White, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. at 328 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
103. Id. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting). "Prudent measures" may be interpreted as 
acts in protection of the public safety. See, e.g., supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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crime. Orozco's confession could then be said to come under the nar­
row scope of the Quarles rule thereby allowing affirmation rather than 
reversal of his conviction. 
The difficulty in defining the amorphous scope of the Quarles rule 
is revealed from this review of Orozco. The truly unfortunate conse­
quence of Quarles is that the narrow scope of the public safety excep­
tion will expand and contract depending on the perspective of a 
particular judge. 104 
B. Rhode Island v. Innis 
Innis was arrested for the armed robbery of a taxicab driver. \05 
Police repeatedly gave Innis Miranda warnings after which he said 
that he wanted to speak with a lawyer. I06 On the trip to the station 
house, with Innis sitting in the back seat of the police car, the police 
officers discussed the hazards of a loose shotgun in the vicinity of a 
school for handicapped children. \07 In response to this conversation 
Innis told the police to turn the car around so he could show them 
where the gun was located. \08 He thereafter divulged the location of 
the gun to the police. The statements and the gun were admitted at 
trial, and Innis was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and murder. \09 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held 
that Innis had been improperly interrogated after invoking his right to 
counsel. I \0 
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded, rein­
stating Innis's conviction. The Court held that Innis had not been 
interrogated by the police after invoking his right to speak with an 
attorney. II I It said that an interrogation for Miranda purposes is not 
limited to express questions but also extends "to any words or actions 
on the part of police . . . that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 112 Based 
104. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
105. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text. 
108. Innis, 446 U.S. at 295. 
109. Id. at 291. The murder charge stemmed from the robbery of another taxicab 
driver the previous week whose body had been discovered the day before Innis was ar­
rested. Id. at 293. 
110. State v. Innis, 120 R.l. 641, 650-52, 391 A.2d 1158, 1163-64 (1978), rev'd, 446 
U.S. 	291 (1980). 
Ill. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-04. 
112. Id. at 300-01. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals had held that placing 
stolen goods outside of the jail cell where an accused burglar was confined was interroga­
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on the fact that the police had no reason to know that Innis was par­
ticularly susceptible "to an appeal to his conscience concerning the 
safety of handicapped children," the Court held that under this stan­
dard the discussion in the police car had not been an interrogation. 1I3 
Application of the Quarles rule to the facts in Rhode Island v. 
Innis I 14 is useful for two reasons. First, like Quarles, Innis involved a 
firearm missing in an area where it could do harm to innocent per­
sons. IIS Second, reexamination of Innis provides an opportunity to 
explore the question of whether the public safety exception would per­
mit custodial questioning of an accused once the accused expresses a 
desire to speak with an attorney."6 
Assuming arguendo that Innis had been interrogated after invok­
ing his right to counsel, as three justices concluded, 117 the facts of the 
case would then be ripe for a Quarles application because it could be 
argued that the interrogation of the accused was conducted in the in­
terest of finding the weapon to protect the public safety. Indeed the 
Quarles Court, in distinguishing Innis, entirely rejected the analogy on 
the basis that the holding in Innis was grounded solely in the finding 
that Innis had not been interrogated. lls 
In Innis the accused was arrested on suspicion of holding up a 
taxicab with a shotgun four hours earlier."9 While the four hour gap 
between the crime and the arrest is a fact similar to that found in 
tion under this formula. People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, 319,472 N.E.2d 13,14,482 
N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (1984); Accord Oney v. Delaware, 482 A.2d 756 (1984). 
113. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302. 
114. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
115. Id. at 294-95. The gun was missing in an area where a school for handicapped 
children was located. See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text. 
116. See infra notes 125-144 and accompanying text. The Court in Innis indicated 
that there is a right to counsel in the Fifth Amendment distinct from the Sixth Amendment 
privilege. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. For a discussion of whether Quarles may extend into 
the Sixth Amendment protections, see infra notes 165-190 and accompanying text. 
117. The Court was split on whether or not Innis had been interrogated within the 
new standard of interrogation. Justices Marshall and Brennan could not "imagine a 
stronger appeal to a suspect--any suspect-than the assertion that if the weapon is not 
found an innocent person would be hurt or killed. . . . The notion that such an appeal 
could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect was known to have some special 
interest in handicapped children verges on the ludicrous." Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissent­
ing)(emphasis in original). 
Justice Stevens took exception to the Court's new standard. Id. at 309-314 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). Additionally, he said that even if the standard developed by the majority 
was a proper one, the case should have been remanded for a factual determination of 
whether Innis had been interrogated under the new test. Id. at 314-317. 
118. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633-34 n.8. 
119. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293-94. 
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Orozco v. Texas,120 two additional factors indicate that Innis is a more 
compelling case than Orozo for the application of the Quarles rule. 
First, there are strong indications that the police were extremely 
concerned about locating the missing shotgun. 121 Although the Court 
in Quarles said that the application of the public safety exception 
would not depend on the sUbjective motivation of the questioning po­
lice officers,122 the officers' profound concern for the location of the 
gun at least provides some indication that there was an actual threat to 
the public's safety. 
Second, the threat is bolstered by the fact that the missing shot­
gun was believed to be in an area frequented by handicapped chil­
dren. 123 Hence, even the most skeptical observer would be compelled 
to find an objectively reasonable need to locate the weapon to secure 
the safety of children who would be passing through the area shortly 
thereafter on their way to school. 124 Consequently, protecting these 
children would most certainly provide a valid basis for interrogation 
of Innis under the Quarles exception. 
One of the most troubling aspects of Quarles is the effect that the 
public safety exception may have on an accused's request for counsel 
after Miranda warnings. 125 The Court in Miranda said that 
[o]nce warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. 
If the individual states that he wants an attorney present, the interrogation 
must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must 
have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present 
during any subsequent questioning. 126 
Hence, the Court in Miranda read a right to counsel component into 
the Fifth Amendment to protect the defendant's right to remain silent, 
which was separate and distinct from the right to counsel guaranteed 
120. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
121. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 295. The police sent a "parade of police cars" to the 
location where Innis said that he had hidden the gun. Additionally, the police captain 
"ordered the numerous officers still present to position their vehicles so that the headlights 
could illuminate the area ...." Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291 (1980). 
122. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. 
123. Innis was arrested one block from a city school serving mentally handicapped 
children. State v. Innis, 120 R.1. 641, 666-67, 391 A.2d 1158,1171 (1978)(Kelleher, J., 
dissenting). 
124. Id. at 667,391 A.2d at 1171 (Kelleher, J., dissenting). Compare New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632 (the gun could have been retrieved by an accom­
plice or found by an employee or a customer). 
125. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1985); infra notes 128-137. 
126. 384 U.S. at 473-74. Accord Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979). 
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by the Sixth Amendment. 127 
The Court in Edwards v. Arizona 128 reinforced the Fifth Amend­
ment right to counsel by developing a bright line for protection of a 
suspect's request for counsel in response to the Miranda warnings. 
Justice White,129 writing for a unanimous Court, held that when an 
accused requests to speak with an attorney the police may not initiate 
further interrogation of the accused 130 "unless the accused himself ini­
tiates further communication."131 Subsequent decisions of the Court 
have indicated that the Edwards initiation requirement "set forth 'a 
prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody 
from being badgered by police officers. . .''' once a request for coun­
sel has been made. 132 
Where public safety is concerned, it is logical to extend the rea­
soning of the Quarles opinion to justify abridgement of the Fifth 
127. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 n.7 (1981). See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 
n.4. 
The difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel is the time at 
which the right attaches. In the Sixth Amendment context, the right to counsel does not 
attach until the commencement of judicial proceedings against the accused. See Williams, 
430 U.S. at 398-99. The Fifth Amendment right, however, attaches once a request for 
counsel is made. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Thus, the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel created by Miranda fills an important gap in the Sixth Amendment right. See 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. 
128. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Edwards was arrested for robbery, burglary, and first­
degree murder. After a brief interrogation session, Edwards indicated that he wanted to 
speak with an attorney. The interrogation then ceased, and Edwards was placed in the 
county jail for the night. The next day the police resumed questioning and told Edwards 
that he had to respond. Edwards then incriminated himself, the confession was introduced 
at trial, and Edwards was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the 
second interrogation was conducted in violation of Miranda, since Edwards had previously 
requested to speak with a lawyer. The Court held that once an accused requests to speak 
with an attorney, the accused "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges or conversations with the police." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478­
488. 
129. Although Justice White's opinion in Edwards gave the Miranda doctrine strong 
support, he has previously expressed grave doubts about the validity of the Miranda rules. 
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531-37 (White, J., dissenting); Mosely, 423 U.S. at 108 (White, J., 
concurring); Orozco, 394 U.S. at 330 (White, J., dissenting); Mathis v. United States, 391 
U.S. I, 5-6 (1968)(White, J., dissenting). Justice White, however, has expressed stronger 
sentiment toward the right to counsel in general than he has toward other aspects of the 
Miranda rules. Compare Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 with Orozco, 394 U.S. at 330 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
130. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The Court somewhat diluted the impact of the 
Edwards initiation requirement in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). 
131. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485. 
132. See Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492 n.2 (1984)(per curiam)(quoting Wy­
rick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 45-46 (1982)(per curiam». 
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Amendment right to counsel. Even when a suspect requests to speak 
to an attorney, the Constitution does not require suppression of re­
sponses to non-coercive public safety interrogation. The Quarles 
Court justified the public safety exception in part by finding that the 
Miranda warnings are not rights protected by the Constitution but 
rather are only a judicially created device to protect the vitality of the 
Fifth Amendment. 133 The Court has noted previously that Miranda's 
requirement that interrogation cease immediately upon the accused's 
request for counsel is not a constitutional mandate but a prophylactic 
device which recognizes that a request for counsel is a per se invoca­
tion of Fifth Amendment rights. 134 Likewise, the lack of a constitu­
tional mandate for the "rigid" prophylactic rule135 of Edwards 136 
suggests its susceptibility to the balancing test of the Quarles 
exception. 137 
Although the plain meaning of Miranda prohibits interrogation 
of a suspect once the suspect invokes the right to speak with coun­
sel,138 the Quarles Court held that departure from Miranda's require­
ments are permissible when there is an imminent threat to public 
safety.139 In essence, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is only 
another prophylactic measure to protect the privilege against self-in­
crimination,14O and this may be outweighed by the need to obtain in­
133. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 s. Ct. at 2631. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433 (1974); supra note 15. 
134. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979); See Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 
490,492-93 (1984); Edwards, 451 U.S at 491-92 (1981)(Powell, J., concurring). 
135. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979). 
136. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring). 
137. The court has previously trimmed back the broad scope of the protections af­
forded by Miranda on the grounds that they are only prophylactic measures to protect 
Fifth Amendment rights. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, -, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 
2633 (1984)(Miranda warnings need not be given when the situation presents exigent cir­
cumstances, which pose a threat to public safety); Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 
(1984)(Edwards rule not to be applied retroactively because it is only a prophylactic rule); 
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15 (1983)(suspect's refusal to take blood 
alcohol test admissible at trial for driving while intoxicated because police inquiry of 
whether suspect will take blood alcohol test is not an interrogation within meaning of Mi­
randa); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,445-46, 449-52 (1974)(failure to advise suspect 
that he has right to appointed counsel does not bar admissibility of testimony of third party 
whose identity was obtained from the accused's lips); Gardner, supra note 15 at 456-60. 
138. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. 
139. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. 2633. But see supra text at note 68; Smith v. 
Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492 (1984)(per curiam)(once an accused requests counsel, interro­
gation must cease to prevent badgering by the police to elicit responses and override the 
defendant's will). 
140. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974); Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 
495 (1984); Solemn v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1342-43 & n.4 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 
462 U.S. 1039 (1983). 
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formation from the accused to avert a public danger. 141 Therefore, the 
conclusion appears inescapable that since the Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel is only a judicially created right, 142 the. balancing approach 
used by the Quarles Court l43 will eventually serve to allow circumven­
tion of the right to counsel when necessary to protect the pUblic. 144 
Proponents of such an extension of Quarles point out that the 
accused can always seek to prove that his statements were not volun­
tary but instead were coerced. 145 Interrogation conducted after an ac­
cused has requested to speak with counsel would weigh heavily against 
a finding that the statements were voluntarily made. 146 The ability of 
the accused to prove that a statement was compelled, however, is a 
heavy burden to sustain. 147 
The possible extension of Quarles to excuse violations of an ac­
cused's Fifth Amendment right to counsel casts the warnings man­
dated by Miranda into the conundrum of a Catch-22.148 On the one 
hand, the police may withhold the warnings in order to protect the 
public. In this instance, "by deliberately withholding Miranda warn­
ings, the police can get information out of suspects who would refuse 
to respond to police questioning were they advised of their constitu­
tional rights."149 On the other hand, even when a suspect invokes his 
judicially created Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police may 
be able to subvert the invocation of these rights by continued interro­
gation that is pursued in the interest of protecting the public. 150 
C. Brewer v. Williams 
Williams was sought for the kidnapping of a ten-year-old girl in 
Des Moines, Iowa.lSI Upon advice of his retained counsel in Des 
141. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2633; See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 544 
(White, J., dissenting). 
142. See supra text at notes 125-26 and 132. 
143. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
144. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2643 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 123 (1977). 
145. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631, n.5; but see Smith v. Illinois, 105 
S. Ct. 490, 495 n.8 (1984)(per curiam)(application of Edwards rule does not depend on 
whether responses were actually coerced). 
146. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
147. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 480-82. 
148. Catch-22 is "a dilemma from which the victim has no escape." OXFORD AMER­
ICAN DICTIONARY 97 (1980). 
149. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see 
Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632. 
150. See supra notes 138-144. 
151. Williams, 430 U.S. 387. 
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Moines, Williams voluntarily surrendered to the Davenport, Iowa, 
police. ls2 Williams's Des Moines attorney advised him by telephone 
not to speak to the police in Davenport nor to the police officers from 
Des Moines who would be driving him back to Des Moines later that 
day.153 The Des Moines officers assigned to transport Williams agreed 
with Williams's attorney not to question Williams during the trip. 
Williams was then arraigned in Davenport on an arrest warrant 
issued in Des Moines charging him with the kidnapping. Williams 
conferred with an attorney in Davenport after the arraignment. 
Detective Learning and another officer arrived from Des Moines to 
transport Williams back to Des Moines. Before embarking on the 
three-hour drive, Williams again spoke with the Davenport lawyer 
who advised him to say nothing to the officers on the drive to Des 
Moines. ls4 Additionally, the Davenport attorney admonished Detec­
tive Learning not to question Williams on the ride to Des Moines. lss 
During the trip, Williams asserted repeatedly that he would not 
answer any questions until he had an opportunity to speak with his 
attorney in Des Moines. ls6 Detective Learning proceeded to engage 
Williams in small talk to set him at ease. IS7 With the knowledge that 
Williams was a religious zealot, Detective Learning delivered the re­
nowned "Christian Burial Speech"158 in the hope of prompting Wil­
liams to disclose the location of the kidnap victim's body.ls9 In 
response to this monologue, Williams led the police to the body.16o 
152. Id. at 390. 
153. Id. at 391. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 391-92. 
156. Id. at 392. 
157. Id. 
158. Detective Learning said to Williams: 
I want to give you something to think about while we're travelling down the 
road.... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's 
sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark 
early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that 
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself 
have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to 
find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel 
that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled 
to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas 
[E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than 
waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not 
being able to find it at all. 
Id. at 392-93. 
159. Id. at 399. 
160. Id. at 393. 
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Williams was subsequently convicted of murder. 161 His convic­
tion was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court which held that Wil­
liams had waived his right to counsel in disclosing the location of the 
body. 162 The United States Supreme Court granted habeas corpus re­
lief. The Court held that Detective Learning's "Christian Burial 
Speech" was a violation of Williams's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, as defined in Massiah v. United States 163 in that it was a delib­
erate attempt to elicit information from Williams after judicial pro­
ceedings had commenced against him.l64 
Consideration of the facts in Brewer v. Williams in light of the 
Quarles opinion presents an opportunity to probe the appropriateness 
of creating a public safety exception to the Sixth Amendment to per­
mit infringement of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel 
in the interest of protecting the public. 165 Although the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is an express constitutional require­
ment,166 the interest in rescuing a kidnap victim or another public 
safety concern may well prompt the Court to hold that such good faith 
motivation is a valid excuse for violation of an accused's Sixth Amend­
ment rights. 167 
Although public safety is a valued goal, the theoretical founda­
161. Id. at 394. 
162. State v. Williams, 182 S.W.2d 396, 402 (Iowa 1970). 
163. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the defendant had been indicted for violations 
of federal narcotics laws. At the behest of federal agent Murphy, Colson, one of Massiah's 
co-defendants, lured Massiah into his car which had been equipped by federal agents with a 
radio transmitter. Colson engaged Massiah in a conversation about the pending charges 
while Murphy eavesdropped on the conversation over the radio. At trial, Murphy testified 
as to the substance of Massiah's self-incriminations, and Massiah was convicted of several 
narcotics violations. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to coun­
sel had been violated when the government had deliberately elicited incriminating state­
ments from him, without the assistance of counsel, subsequent to the indictments. Id. 
164. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398-99. The Court said that the Iowa court had applied 
the wrong standard for determining whether Williams had waived his rights. [d. at 401-04. 
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Iowa Supreme Court had erroneously analyzed the 
case as one involving a violation of Miranda. [d. at 397. Instead the Court said that Wil­
liams's right to counsel as defined in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), had 
been violated, that is, once judicial proceedings have begun, the government may not delib­
erately elicit incriminating responses from the defendant. Williams, 430 U.S. at 397-98. 
The Court implied that the standard for waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
higher than the standard for waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that the 
government had not met its burden of proof that Williams had waived his Sixth Amend­
ment right. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interroga­
tion"? When does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1,28-33 (1978). 
165. See infra text at notes 172-179. 
166. See infra text at notes 168-171. 
167. See infra notes 172-190 and accompanying text. 
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tion of Quarles weighs heavily against creating an emergency excep­
tion to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The foundation of the 
public safety exception rests in a determination that the warnings re­
quired by Miranda are not constitutionally required but rather are ju­
dicial devices to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege. 168 Violations 
of Miranda are excused on public safety grounds because the accused 
does not have a constitutional right per se to receive the warnings but 
only to be free from being compelled to incriminate himself. Hence 
the need for Miranda warnings, as prophylactic measures, may be 
outweighed by the need to protect the public. 169 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is derived directly from 
the Constitution,170 and thus it should not be susceptible to the same 
balancing approach to which the Miranda protections were subjected 
in Quarles. A public safety concern should not be sufficient to justify a 
violation of the constitutionally mandated right to counsel in the Sixth 
Amendment. Deliberately elicting statements from the accused after 
institution of judicial proceedings against him violates his substantive 
Sixth Amendment rights171 rather than only judicially created 
safeguards. 
Chief Justice Burger, however, has expressed the view that the 
rule of Massiah 172 is only a prophylactic device to protect the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.173 He reasons that the Sixth Amend­
ment seeks to protect only the fairness of the accused's trial. Conse­
quently, requiring exclusion of all statements obtained from the 
accused without the assistance of counsel, without considering the ac­
tual effect on the trial of using the uncounseled statements, is only a 
prophylactic device to ensure the Sixth Amendment goal of providing 
the accused a fair trial. 174 
In his recent dissent in Maine v. Moulton, 175 the Chief Justice said 
that no Sixth Amendment violation exists when inculpatory state­
168. See supra text at notes 42-43. 
169. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 s. Ct. at 2626; Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285. 
170. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. Xl. 
The accused's right to counsel attaches upon the institution of formal judicial proceed­
ings against him. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980); Brewer v. Wil­
liams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
171. Henry, 447 U.S. at 270; Williams, 430 U.S. at 398-99; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. 
172. "[T]he clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have com­
menced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government 
interrogates him." Williams, 430 U.S. at 397-98. 
173. Williams, 430 U.S. at 425-26 (Burger, C.]., dissenting). 
174. Id. 
175. 54 U.S.L.W. 4039 (U.S. December 10, 1985). 
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ments are elicited deliberately from an indicted defendant pursuant to 
a legitimate law enforcement investigation targeted against the defend­
ant's planning and perpetration of additional crimes. 176 The Chief 
Justice stated that the incriminating statements pertaining to the in­
dictment should not have been suppressed because "the state was not 
trying to build its theft case against [Moulton] in obtaining the evi­
dence, [and thus] excluding the evidence from the theft trial will not 
affect police behavior at all."177 
The Chief Justice remarked that evidence gathered after Sixth 
Amendment deprivations should be supressed only after the costs and 
benefits are weighed. Accordingly he would not exclude evidence ob­
tained in violation of Massiah when the officers were acting" 'for legit­
imate purposes not related to the gathering of evidence concerning the 
crime for which [the defendant] had been indicted.' "178 Suppression 
of such evidence is inappropriate when the fairness of the trial is not 
affected, and the police act in good faith, leaving no conduct to 
deter. 179 
This argument parallels that advanced in Quarles,180 viz, that un­
coerced statements obtained in violation of the prophylactic rules of 
Miranda should not be suppressed where exclusion would not advance 
Fifth Amendment goals. The Chief Justice's view, therefore, provides 
fertile ground for the planting of a public safety exception to the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. Proponents would argue that Massiah 
does not mandate suppression of statements made without assistance 
of counsel if these were obtained to protect the public. In such cases, 
so long as the police conduct does not affect the fairness of the ac­
cused's trial, the evidence should not be suppressed because exclusion 
of the evidence would not advance Sixth Amendment values,181 and 
the cost of exclusion is too high. 
Justice Traynor, writing for the California Supreme Court in Peo­
176. Id. at 4047, 4048 (Burger, c.J., dissenting). In Moulton, the defendant, who 
had been indicted on theft charges, proposed a plan to his co-defendant that they kill the 
state's chief witness against them. The co-defendant, fearing for his own life, permitted the 
police to conceal a transmitter on his person prior to meeting with the defendant. During 
the course of the discussions about the proposed killing of the witness, the defendant made 
incriminating statements, monitored by the police, which related to the subject matter of 
the indictment. 
177. Id. at 4048. 
178. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984». 
179. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984». 
180. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630-2631. 
181. Id. Cj. Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2626 (Even though Miranda is 
violated, suppression is not required so long as statement is voluntarily made under the 
totality of the circumstances.) 
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pie v. Modesto lS2 suggested that the Sixth Amendment should not con­
strain the police from interrogating a suspect when they are searching 
for a missing kidnap victim.ls3 The court said that "the officers' inves­
tigatory and rescue operations were inextricably interwoven until [the 
victim's] body was found, and it would be needlessly restrictive to ex­
clude any evidence lawfully obtained during the rescue operations."184 
Under such circumstances Massiah does not control, and the accused's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel 185 may be infringed if necessary to 
obtain information to save the life of a kidnap victim. 186 The Califor­
nia courts have followed the "rescue theory" in holding that the police 
are justified in failing to give Miranda warnings when interrogating a 
suspect in the effort to find a kidnap victim.187 
Massiah, however, did not prevent the police from deliberately 
elicting statements from the accused in violation of the Sixth Amend­
ment in such exigent circumstances, but it prohibited the use of these 
statements in evidence at trial. I88 Moreover, the Court in Williams, 
while noting that attempting to locate a kidnap victim might be a no­
182. 62 Cal.2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965). 
183. Id. at 446, 398 P.2d at 759, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 423. 
184. Id. at 446-47, 398 P.2d at 759, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 423. 
185. The Modesto court believed that Massiah was applicable under the "focus test" 
of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), wherein the court held that the Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel attaches when the police investigation of the crime has focused on the 
accused. Under the present interpretation of Massiah, however, Modesto's Sixth Amend­
ment right would not attach until he was formally charged. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 
(1972). Nonetheless, even though Massiah would not be applicable in Modesto under to­
day's standards, Traynor's analysis of the kidnapping issue in the Sixth Amendment con­
text illuminates the potential breadth of the public safety doctrine. 
186. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d at 447, 398 P.2d at 759, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 423. 
187. People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 937 (1979); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974). The 
California courts, however, recognizing that constitutional protections for the criminally 
accused must be given broad effect, narrowly defined the rescue situations in which police 
could fail to give Miranda warnings. In People v. Riddle, the court developed a three-part 
test to determine whether a given situation provided a sufficient justification not to give 
Miranda warnings: 
(1) urgency of need in that no other course of action promises relief; 
(2) possibility of saving human life by rescuing a person whose life is in danger; 
(3) rescue as primary purpose and motive of the interrogators. 
83 Cal. App. 3d at 576; 148 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (1978). 
In Brewer v. Williams, the violation of Williams's Sixth Amendment rights would not 
be excused under this test since at the time the "Christian Burial Speech" was given, the 
police no longer believed that the kidnapping victim was no longer alive. See supra note 
158. 
188. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206-07; cf Quarles, 467 U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2648 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)(Miranda does not proscribe this sort of questioning but rather 
prohibits the introduction of such statements at trial). 
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ble goal, said that "[d]isinterested zeal for the public good does not 
assure either wisdom or right in the method it pursues."189 Thus the 
express constitutional status of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
would appear to present too high an obstacle for the Quarles opinion 
to leap. Whereas the logic of Quarles lends itself to an extension of the 
emergency exception to the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the 
reasoning of Quarles does not support a violation of the express Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. On the other hand, legitimate concerns 
for a kidnap victim may provide sufficient justification for infringing 
upon the accused's Sixth Amendment right and allowing statements 
thus obtained to be admissible at trial. In considering that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is constitutionally mandated, the rescue 
justification, if adopted, should be applied narrowly190 to prevent the 
complete erosion of the right to counsel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court in Quarles determined that the 
need to protect the public from imminent threats outweighs a criminal 
suspect's need to receive the warnings developed in Miranda v. Ari­
zona to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Although the 
Court claims to have lifted a dilemma from the shoulders of the police, 
the Court has created many new questions, yet provided few answers. 
One question the court left open is the type of emergency that would 
justify the failure to give the Miranda warnings. The scope of the 
Quarles exception will be determined upon the lower courts' interpre­
tation of how ominous a threat to public safety was present in a given 
situation. Although the Supreme Court indicated that only an immi­
nent threat to the public safety would justify a failure to adhere to 
Miranda, much will tum on the perceptions of the individual judge, 
thereby creating widely disparate results. 
Post hoc examination of an alleged threat to public safety will 
severely limit the broad protection Miranda provided for the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Given the exigent circumstance, interroga­
tion designed to quell a threat to public safety is likely to be compel­
ling. Using such statements, obtained pursuant to Quarles, to prove a 
defendant's guilt creates a direct clash with the Fifth Amendment. 
Placing on the accused the burden of proving that the statements were 
189. 430 U.S. at 406 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 605 (1948) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring». 
190. See supra note 187. 
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coerced defeats the intent of the Miranda decision-to remove such a 
burden from the accused. 
Additionally, the Quarles decision may foreshadow an expanded 
emphasis on public safety where the need to protect the public may 
provide a sufficient justification to excuse the failure to adhere to other 
Supreme Court pronouncements on the rights of criminal suspects. 
The requirement that interrogation cease after an accused requests to 
speak with an attorney is designed to assist the accused in the exercise 
of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Since this Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel, however, is not a constitutionally mandated protection, the 
need to protect the public may well serve as a justification for interro­
gating a suspect even after he makes a request to speak with an 
attorney. 
Allowing the use at trial of statements obtained as a result of pub­
lic safety interrogation after the accused requests to speak with coun­
sel would further diminish Miranda's Fifth Amendment safeguards. 
Such a rule would deny an accused the assurance that the police would 
only communicate in the presence of counsel once a request for a law­
yer was made. A rule allowing the police to continue an interrogation 
after invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel would, in 
effect, deprive the Miranda requirements of their substance. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because it enjoys a direct 
constitutional mandate, is not as easily balanced away. While the 
Quarles rule hinges on the notion that the Miranda warnings are only 
procedural rights, the dictates of the Sixth Amendment are absolute 
and cannot be outweighed by the need to protect the public. 
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger has suggested cutting 
back the broad meaning which Massiah read into the Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel. Burger's characterization of Massiah 's rule as 
only prophylactic leaves the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only a 
step away from the Quarles balancing test. The Court might find the 
rescue of a kidnapping victim, for example, sufficient justification to 
define a narrow public safety exception and forgive violation of the 
Sixth Amendment in limited circumstances. 
Creation of such a public safety exceptin to the Sixth Amendment 
is inconsistent with the evolution of the right to counsel. Casting Mas­
siah as no more than a prophylactic rule turns the clock back on the 
most fundamental right enjoyed by the accused in a criminal prosecu­
tion. Our fundamental constitutional protections are directly endan­
gered by the denial of counsel during interrogation to a person against 
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whom adversarial proceedings have begun. No good faith exception 
can justify such an action. 
Jeffrey E. Levine 
